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THE ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION: POLICY NOTE
Endemic corruption continues to stifle
Bangladesh, as it has done since the nation’s
inception.  Corruption has impeded our
economic development, impaired investor
confidence, prejudiced the development of
public education and health, weakened our
democracy and called into question the rule
of law.  It has brought Bangladesh to the
brink of being a failed state. The former
Bureau of Anti-Corruption (BAC) proved to
be completely ineffective in stemming the
tide.  The new Anti-Corruption Commission
(ACC), established on 21 November 2004,
was dysfunctional until the arrival of the
current Caretaker Government1.
This Caretaker Government has brought
political will, commitment and resources to the
fight against corruption.  It has assigned new
leadership to the ACC, and has dedicated
new resources to the investigation and
prosecution of cases. In recent months, the
ACC has launched numerous investigations
and it has already started prosecuting high-
profile politicians and public servants.
The Institute of Governance Studies (IGS)
considers that the implementation of
appropriate policy reforms is imperative. In
order to strengthen the ACC in its pursuit of
the mandated functions and for long-term
sustainability, the following four thematic
issues need immediate attention from the
ACC, the government and other relevant
stakeholders:
ISSUE 1: The ACC must be independent - to
develop public trust, the ACC should be free
of undue political, executive or private
influence.
ISSUE 2: The ACC must be accountable - to
promote government accountability, the ACC
must itself be accountable.
ISSUE 3: The ACC must be effective - to
maintain public trust, the ACC must be
successful in developing and implementing
its anti-corruption strategies. 
ISSUE 4: The ACC must be efficient - to be
sustainable, the ACC must maximize its use
of limited resources.
IGS organized an international workshop
aimed at developing stakeholder-driven,
relevant, and practical policy
recommendations.2 This policy note follows
the workshop discussions and the four main
themes3 related to areas where the ACC
could improve. The role of other institutions
in strengthening the anti-corruption
framework was also discussed.
In this policy note, we explain each of these
policies and define the actions required to
implement them.  If not implemented, it is our
opinion that corruption in Bangladesh will
suffocate the nation in the future just as it has
in the past.4 The series of recommendations
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have been categorized as short, medium and
long-term options, which could be a road
map for policy makers and practitioners in
implementing a reform agenda.
INDEPENDENCE
The Government should initiate measures to
provide the ACC with financial, administrative
and political independence provided by
strengthening of the Anti-Corruption
Commission Act, 2004 (ACC Act), ensuring
budgetary independence, and securing non-
partisan, professional staffing and leadership.
The experience of the former Bureau of Anti-
Corruption indicates that lack of independence
has hindered the Bureau’s effectiveness in
fighting endemic corruption. The Bureau was
under the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and
lacked operational independence.
Independence of the ACC will ensure that its
functions are not influenced deliberately or
inadvertently by vested interests.
Policy Recommendation: Amendments of
the ACC Act are required to ensure financial
and operational independence from the
Executive. These amendments include
revision and inclusion of legal safeguards,
as well as guiding principles that are
designed to protect the Commission's
independence. 
Short-term options
Secure financial independence through a
permanent source of funding. A long-term block
grant could be provided by the Parliament at
the beginning of each new term but the specific
amount may be fixed in the annual budget and
open to parliamentary debate.
Make available audit-exempt funds for
certain operational activities.
Contract a neutral third party to conduct
regular external audits.
Include appropriate provisions in the ACC
Act to reduce the scope of judicial
intervention, particularly by restricting the
use of stay proceedings in higher courts.
Entrench the tenure of ACC Commissioners
through constitutional amendments by
revising sections 10 (which refers to the
constitutional provision for securing tenure of
the Commissioners), 24, 25 (which constrain
the functioning of the ACC by other
provisions or government bodies) and 34
(which requires the President to approve the
rules of the ACC) of the ACC Act.
Opt for direct recruitment of staff rather than
through the Public Service Commission
(PSC), until the latter has been reformed and
its scope of activities defined. Strengthen the
prosecution unit of the ACC by recruiting an
internal team of lawyers, who may be hired
on a contractual basis at competitive rates.
The compensation package of existing and
new staff needs to be revised and innovative
ideas (for example, credit points for future
promotion on successful prosecution of
corrupt individuals) explored, which will
motivate staff to operate more efficiently but
without compromising due process of law
Medium-term options
Balance the selection committee of the ACC
Chairman and Commissioners with
members from the public and private sectors.
ACC leadership qualifications should
essentially be merit-based.
Ensure participation of the Chairman in the
selection of the two other
Commissioners.This could encourage a
more conducive team environment and
effort. The selection criteria for both the
selection committee and the ACC leadership
can be developed in consultation with a
National Search Committee.
Create transparency within the selection
process of both the selection committee and 
Institutions of Accountability: The Anti-Corruption Commission Policy Note 3
the ACC leadership by holding open hearings
in which the public may attend as spectators
but not participate in the proceedings (if
holding open hearings seems implausible in
Bangladesh, as an alternative, nominated
names can be published in newspapers for
public awareness and debate).
Stagger the appointments of the three
Commissioners so that there is continuity of
experience and expertise.
Subject the ACC leadership to impeachment
and removal from office by the President on
recommendation of the Supreme Judicial
Council.
Long-term options 
ACC should join the rank of other
constitutional bodies such as the Office of
the Comptroller and Auditor-General, Office
of the Ombudsman, the Election
Commission, and the Public Service
Commission. This will require an amendment
of the Constitution with two-third votes of the
elected MPs.
ACCOUNTABILITY
The ACC should be accountable to the
citizens of Bangladesh by conducting its
affairs in a transparent manner and by
enforcing stringent ethical standards in its
financial and personnel management
systems, including publishing its rules and
ethical standards together with annual
reports on performance. The Bureau of Anti-
Corruption was accountable to the PMO and
lacked transparency. The ACC, under the
previous regime, failed in terms of
accountability and transparency. Annual
reports were not published and there was no
formal mechanism in place to maintain
internal accountability.
Policy Recommendation: Internal
accountability principles are prescribed
along with fine tuning of the existing
external accountability mechanisms to
improve the Commission’s accountability.
Participation of the civil society in the ACC
is suggested to bring about transparency
which in turn will reinforce accountability.
Short-term options
Specify the form and contents of the annual
report in the ACC Rules and Regulations.
The annual report should be sent directly to
the Speaker of Parliament and disseminated
through website, newspaper supplements,
television/radio programs.
Create an ad hoc committee, under the
direction of (at least) one of the ACC
Commissioners, to devise the following:  
! Rules and Regulations under the Act,
including financial management and
accountability policies which will
determine the daily functions of the ACC 
! A strategic plan (should be published
and made available in the public
domain) that will establish targets to be
adhered to by the ACC and will include: 
! Code of Conduct for all staff 
(including leadership and lawyers) 
! Criteria for performance 
assessment
! Media/Communications Policy 
The committee may look at other institutions
with strong internal accountability
mechanisms such as the army, private sector
entities (domestic) and other anti-corruption
institutions worldwide and adopt those
mechanisms appropriate for the ACC. 
Secure a balance between transparency of
the Commission’s activities and protection of 
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sensitive information which is yet to be
adjudicated upon and therefore could
potentially damage individuals' reputation
unfairly and cause irreparable damage.
Therefore, a policy for the protection of
sensitive information is necessary.
Aggregated data should be published rather
than case-specific data.
Medium-term options 
Submit the annual report directly to the
Speaker of Parliament and to a standing
committee in Parliament.
Place the annual report before the
Parliament by the Speaker and allocate time
to ensure a thorough debate on the salient
points of the report.
Have a practically designed website which
will act as a window for disseminating ACC
information to the public and improving its
transparency. 
Create a permanent oversight committee,
composed of a wide cross-section of
professional groups to ensure that the
policies adopted by the ad hoc committee
are implemented and enforced.  This
committee should report directly and only to
the ACC Commissioners.
EFFECTIVENESS 
The powers of the Commission should be
sufficient to meet its mandate and should
conform to the extent possible to
international good practice. The ACC should
publicly and annually measure its
effectiveness by prioritizing its programs,
setting benchmarks to chart progress and
shortcomings, and identifying areas for
improvement. The ACC does not (and the
BAC did not) have such provisions to gauge
its effectiveness.
Policy Recommendation: ACC should
partner with public and private institutions to
carry out its mandate. It will prioritize
prosecution of cases, as success in this
area may also serve as deterrent.
Benchmark of success will guide the
Commission toward effectiveness and will
highlight the areas that need improvement. 
Short-term options 
Explicitly define corruption in the ACC Act
and the offences that fall under the
jurisdiction of the ACC.
Increase public awareness of the heavy risk
and penalties that accompany corruption-
based offences by utilizing NGOs, media,
and civil society to educate the public on the
consequences of corruption. Public
mobilization through information sharing
should counterbalance the lack of political
will through strengthening preventative
activities. The following institutions  and/or
mechanisms may be used for raising public
awareness:
! Schools: through curriculum and student
organizations.
! Website: by publishing wealth statements
of public officials online. 
! Business groups: involving the
Chambers of Commerce.
! Database: by facilitating information-
sharing among ACC, NBR, police,
financial and other institutions involved in
investigating corruption crimes.
! Religious establishments: by raising
awareness and public opinion against
corruption.
Partner with research institutions, business
schools, and the Attorney General’s office to
build case studies related to corruption, 
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study management flaws and identify areas
wherein corruption can originate.
Impose heavy punishment for corruption
crimes while providing appropriate incentives
to corruption fighters in the form of public
recognition, efficiency bonus etc. 
Follow a top-down operational strategy
rather than bottom-up: the ACC should
address grand corruption before moving on
to petty corruption.
Avoid legal hindrances of investigations by
training ACC staff on the legal requirements
of investigative procedures.
Medium-term options 
Contract a neutral body (e.g. a research
institution or think-tank) to periodically review
the ACC legislation to identify loopholes.
Conduct an annual survey of public
perception of the ACC’s activities and
performance, e.g. perception of corruption
control in Bangladesh, perception of ACC’s
performance in corruption control, perception
of impartiality of ACC’s investigations,
perception of ACC’s investigation powers 
Long-term options 
While focusing on high-level corruption,
designate resources to prosecute petty
corruption as it is corruption at the lower
levels that inflicts the most suffering on the
general public.
Continue public awareness raising activities.
EFFICIENCY
The ACC should establish comprehensive
criteria to measure and report on internal
efficiency of its operations, including the rate
of disposal of old cases, the setting of time
frames for handling citizen complaints and
new cases, the rate by which cases are
prosecuted and the success rate of
prosecutions.
Policy Recommendation: The ACC should
take operational and policy decisions to embark
on higher standard of efficiency in fighting
endemic corruption. An internal operational
procedure for disposing case backlog in a
feasible manner should be in place.
Short-term options 
Decide  how much funding may be allocated
to each pending case.
Dispose  of former BAC cases pending with
the ACC on a pro rata basis, perhaps by
seeking assistance from retired
judges/senior lawyers.
Amend the time frame for disposal of cases in
the ACC Act to a more practical time frame,
indicating clearly the consequence or action
to follow if a case is not disposed of within the
indicated time period. If prosecutions are
rushed and principles of natural justice
compromised then, at some point, the higher
courts will declare them unlawful.
Medium-term options 
Create a set of benchmarks to achieve
efficiency (e.g. the following benchmarks
based on the Singapore CPIB5):
! Cycle time - time taken to complete an
investigation 
! Completion rate - percentage of cases
completed in a year 
! Prosecution rate - percentage of cases
resulting in prosecution
! Conviction rate - percentage of cases
convicted in court
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ROLE OF OTHER INSTITUTIONS 
Using its role as the lead institution for
preventing corruption, the ACC should
introduce and sustain a major program of
collaborative relationships with major public
institutions involved in fighting corruption in
order to support a nation-wide, well-
coordinated and integrated approach to
ending corruption in Bangladesh.
Short-term options 
Hire attorneys to represent the Commission
at competitive market rates to ensure that
competent counsel are prosecuting ACC
cases. Appropriate co-ordination should be
established between the ACC and the
Attorney General’s office.
Incorporate zero tolerance policies
concerning corruption in each
department/ministry’s mission statement.
Medium-term options 
Create within the ACC a cell that facilitates
cooperative working relationships among
relevant institutions.
Create a Committee of retired Chief Justices
to oversee the judicial process as well as
identify and provide solutions in case of
lapses at the judiciary level.
Long-term options 
Build capacity within the ACC in areas that
require specialization e.g. investigation.
Establish an internal control measure across
all government departments and ministries to
address most of the petty corruption.
Create anti-corruption units within each
department and ministry to deal with petty
corruption. These units will submit quarterly
reports to the ACC detailing their activities.
Establish a Rapid Action Group (RAG) to
investigate corruption within each
government department and ministry.
Incorporate the National Integrity Strategy,
currently in the process of preparation, into
departmental and ministerial cultures, thus
encouraging leadership from within.
CONCLUSION
The success of the ACC will depend on the
political, social, and economic climate that
allows it to work with adequate resources
and in an independent manner.  Without
strong political backing of the government,
the ACC can not accomplish its mission,
despite the presence of internal support and
sound leadership. A key component of
creating credibility is the ACC’s
independence, which should be balanced
with accountability through oversight
mechanisms. In order to maintain a superior
level of efficiency, the ACC must be properly
informed of the mandates of its guiding
legislation and be aware of how to proceed
with its functions. In addition, the ACC must
be given the appropriate powers to conduct
effective investigations and prosecutions of
crimes of corruption.
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